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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1995, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act (PSLRA)1 and changed the way securities fraud cases are 
litigated. Among its most notable alterations, the PSLRA heightened 
the pleading requirements for a securities fraud action under Section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,2 and Securities 
Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5.3 Under the PSLRA’s new 
standards, plaintiffs are required to show a “strong inference” of the 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2006, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; University of Wisconsin-Madison, B.A., May 2002. Julie Ann Sullivan 
is a member of the Chicago-Kent Law Review. She would like to thank her parents 
and sister for their unconditional love and support. She would also like to thank 
Judge John W. Darrah, Jim Dvorak, Hal Morris, and John G. New for their 
confidence and guidance in her legal writing. She dedicates this article to them, as 
well as in loving memory of Capt. Joe Fenton Lusk, Madison, and Jazz. 
1 See Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in sections of 15 
U.S.C. §§ 77, 78) (2000)).  
2 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2000). 
3 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005). 
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required state of mind, known in securities law as scienter.4 Prior to 
the enactment of the PSLRA, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
required plaintiffs to show a “strong inference” of scienter, while its 
sister circuits applied more lenient standards for pleading scienter.5 
Under the Second Circuit’s pre-PSLRA standard, scienter could be 
satisfied by “intentional conduct or recklessness,” and a “strong 
inference” of scienter could be established by adequately pleading that 
the defendant had a motive and opportunity to defraud the plaintiff.6 
Significantly, Congress incorporated the “strong inference” of scienter 
language into the PSLRA pleading requirements. It remains hotly 
debated, however, whether Congress intended to adopt the Second 
Circuit’s pre-PSLRA approach, including its motive and opportunity 
test, or if it merely borrowed the language of that standard.7 This note 
explores those two issues: (1) whether the substantive standard of 
scienter changed with the enactment of the PSLRA, and (2) whether 
pleading motive and opportunity to defraud is sufficient to adequately 
allege scienter for securities fraud actions. 
Section I of this note provides background information on the 
laws governing securities regulation and the effect of the PSLRA on 
securities fraud actions. Section II analyzes the recent Seventh Circuit 
decision, Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc.,8 which 
presented the first opportunity for the Seventh Circuit to address the 
heightened pleading requirements of the PSLRA. Section III provides 
an overview of the current circuit split on the two major scienter 
issues: (1) the whether the PSLRA altered the substantive standard of 
scienter, specifically, whether recklessness is still a sufficient state of 
mind; and (2) whether pleading motive and opportunity to defraud 
                                                 
4 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2). 
5 Compare In re Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993) 
superceded by statute on other grounds as stated in Marksman Partners, L.P. v. 
Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (plaintiff must 
demonstrate “strong inference” of scienter)); with In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 
F.3d 1541 (9th Cir. 1994) (plaintiff need only allege that scienter existed).  
6 See In re Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 269. 
7 Compare Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2000); with In re Silicon 
Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999). 
8 437 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2006).  
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constitutes the requisite “strong inference” under the PSLRA’s scienter 
requirement. Section IV analyzes how the Seventh Circuit’s decision 
affects the current state of the law, namely, how the Seventh Circuit 
fits into the current circuit split. This section also discusses how 
Makor overhauls the standards for securities fraud actions within the 
Seventh Circuit and its district courts. Section V discusses why the 
Makor decision is correct in holding that recklessness remains 
adequate under the substantive standard of scienter after the PSLRA, 
and why the “middle of the road” approach to the motive and 
opportunity test is likewise the wisest route to take. Section VI 
concludes that the Seventh Circuit adopted the proper substantive 
standard of scienter, as well as the proper interpretation of the requisite 
“strong inference.” Finally, this article concludes that achieving 
uniformity amongst the circuits is vital and will require a grant of 
certiorari or Congressional action for clarification. 
 
I. BACKGROUND ON THE PSLRA 
 
Reacting to the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great 
Depression, Congress designed modern securities laws to “substitute a 
philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and 
thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities 
industry.”9 Congress sought to establish honest markets with honest 
publicity and to minimize mystery and secrecy in the marketplace.10 
To this end, Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,11 
including section 10(b) which prohibited securities fraud and created 
an investor cause of action when violated.12  
                                                 
9 Id. at 595 (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 
186 (1963)). 
10 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988) (citing H.R. REP. No. 73-
1383, at 11 (1934)); see also Makor, 437 F.3d at 595.  
11 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b), and Securities Exchange Commission Rule 
10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; see also Makor, 437 F.3d at 594. 
12 See 15 U.S.C. § 78t. Subsequent to section 10(b), the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) passed Rule 10b-5, which mirrored section 10(b) of the 
3
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A. Pre-PSLRA Pleading Requirements 
 
Before Congress passed the PSLRA, the Circuit Courts of 
Appeals agreed that recklessness was a sufficient substantive standard 
of scienter for securities fraud actions.13 The courts understood 
recklessness to be the standard articulated by the Seventh Circuit in 
Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp.,14 which defined recklessness 
as: 
[H]ighly unreasonable omission, involving 
not merely simple, or even excusable 
negligence, but an extreme departure from 
the standards of ordinary care, and which 
presents a danger of misleading buyers or 
sellers that is either known to the defendant 
or is so obvious that the actor must have 
been aware of it.15  
 
At this stage, the substantive standard of scienter was undisputed.  
Prior to the PSLRA’s enactment, securities fraud lawsuits such as 
section 10(b) claims were governed by the pleading standards for 
fraud set forth in Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.16 
Under Rule 9(b), the plaintiff is required to state “the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake . . . with particularity.”17 Even under the 
Rule 9(b) pleading regime, the circuit courts applied varying 
                                                                                                                   
Securities Exchange Act. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. Congress also passed the 
Securities Act of 1933 in attempts to reach its goals. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa. 
13 See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d. Cir. 
1978); Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1568-69 (9th Cir. 1990) (en 
banc). 
14 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).  
15 Sundstrand, 553 F.2d at 1044-45; see Hollinger, 914 F.2d at 1569 (quoting 
Sundstrand); Rolf, 570 F.2d at 47 (quoting Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 
790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977), but adopting the language of Sundstrand). 
16 Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); see In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 548 
(6th Cir. 1999). 
17 Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); In re Comshare, 183 F.3d at 548.  
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standards.18 The spectrum widened as the Second and Ninth Circuits 
adopted significantly different pleading requirements: the Second 
Circuit required the plaintiff to present facts sufficient to create a 
“strong inference” of scienter,19 while the Ninth Circuit adopted a very 
relaxed standard that did not require a plaintiff to allege any specific 
facts to support scienter.20  
While Rule 9(b) already required a higher pleading standard for 
fraud claims than required for ordinary federal notice pleading, the 
Supreme Court noted that “litigation under [Securities Exchange 
Commission] Rule 10b-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness different 
in degree and in kind from that which accompanies litigation in 
general,”21 and members of both political parties in Congress agreed 
that meritless securities fraud actions and strike suits22 continued to 
plague the courts and financially bind market players.23 Congress 
concluded that Rule 9(b) failed to prevent the abuse of the securities 
laws by private litigants and that a more stringent standard was still 
needed.24 On December 22, 1995, overriding President Clinton’s veto, 
Congress amended the Securities Exchange Act with the PSLRA in 
                                                 
18 See S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 
693. 
19 See In re Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993); see also 
Rick M. Simmons, Comment, Reconciling Pleading Standards Under Pirraglia: The 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act v. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 
81 DENV. U. L. REV. 665, 667 (2004). 
20 See generally In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541 (9th Cir. 1994). If 
a plaintiff simply stated that “scienter existed,” this was sufficient under the Ninth 
Circuit’s pleading requirements. Id. at 1547. 
21 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975). 
22 A “strike suit” is defined as a suit often based on no valid claim, brought 
either for nuisance value or as leverage to obtain a favorable or inflated settlement. 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1448 (7th ed. 1999). Such a suit is often brought by 
small shareholders of a corporation with the intention to force a settlement instead of 
expending money on costly discovery and defense of the suit. See GILBERT’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 318 (pocket size ed. 1997). 
23 See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 739. 
24 Id.; see In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir. 1999). 
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hopes of eliminating meritless claims beyond the motion to dismiss 
phase.25 
 
B. The Passage of the PSLRA:  
A New Pleading Standard or Codification of a Previous Standard? 
 
The PSLRA was designed to curb “abusive class action securities 
fraud litigation” while still protecting investors and promoting 
confidence in the financial marketplace by heightening the pleading 
standards for securities fraud actions beyond the requirements of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).26 Specifically, Congress sought 
to eliminate the unnecessary increase in costs of raising capital caused 
by corporate fears of disclosing bad news since this news may be 
perceived as fraud.27 Legislators acknowledged that strike suits were 
frequently being used to gain large settlement recoveries by misusing 
discovery and making it more economical for the victimized party to 
settle.28  
Pursuant to the PSLRA, a claim under Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-
5 must state with particularity that (1) the defendant made a false 
statement or omission (2) of material fact (3) with scienter (4) in 
connection with the purchase or sale of securities (5) upon which the 
plaintiff justifiably relied and (6) the false statement or omission 
                                                 
25 In re Comshare, 183 F.3d at 548 (citing the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737); see 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(b)(3)(A) (failure to meet pleading requirements will result in dismissal of the 
complaint). 
26 Jeffrey A. Berens, Pleading Scienter Under the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995, 31-FEB COLO. LAW. 39, 40 (2002). 
27 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 759-60 (1975) 
(discussing concerns of frivolous securities lawsuits’ negative effect on the 
marketplace); see also In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 531 (3d Cir. 
1999). 
28 See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.); Novak v. Kasaks, 216 
F.3d 300, 306 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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proximately caused the plaintiff’s damages.29 Specifically, the 
PSLRA’s pleading standard for scienter required the following:  
In any private action arising under this 
chapter in which the plaintiff may recover 
money damages only on proof that the 
defendant acted with a particular state of 
mind, the complaint shall, with respect to 
each act or omission alleged to violate this 
chapter, state with particularity facts giving 
rise to a strong inference that the defendant 
acted with the required state of mind.30 
 
If the plaintiff fails to meet this requirement of a “strong 
inference” of scienter, a court should dismiss the complaint on 
motion.31 But did the substantive standard of scienter change? Is 
recklessness as defined by Sundstrand still enough? And what 
constitutes a “strong inference” of scienter? It appears from the 
legislative history of the PSLRA that even Congress was uncertain.32  
Because the PSLRA adopted the “strong inference” language 
from the Second Circuit’s pre-PSLRA standard, it appeared that 
Congress adopted the Second Circuit case law on the issue. However, 
the Second Circuit’s “strong inference” pre-PSLRA standard could be 
demonstrated in different ways: (1) by showing actual knowledge; (2) 
by demonstrating that the defendant had “the motive to commit fraud 
and an opportunity to do so” (referred to as the motive and opportunity 
test); or (3) by pleading facts of “circumstantial evidence of either 
                                                 
29,Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 
2006); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
30 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2). 
31 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3). 
32 See In re Advanta, 180 F.3d at 531-33 (detailing the Congressional debate 
over what “strong inference” of scienter within the PSLRA means); see also Erin M. 
O’Gara, Note, Comfort With the Majority: The Eighth Circuit Weighs in on the 
Proper Pleading Test for a Securities Fraud Claim in Florida State Board of 
Administration v. Green Tree Financial Corporation, 270 F.3d 645 (8th Cir. 2001), 
82 NEB. L. REV. 1276, 1282-83 (2004).  
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reckless or conscious behavior.”33 So the question remained: Were all 
three of the Second Circuit’s pre-PSLRA approaches sufficient under 
the PSLRA? Although the Senate Committee stated that it did not 
intend to codify the Second Circuit’s pre-PSLRA standard for scienter, 
it did note that “courts might find this body of law instructive” and 
that the PSLRA’s pleading standard was not “a new and untested 
pleading standard that would generate additional litigation.”34 
Subsequently, the Senate did adopt an amendment that codified the 
Second Circuit’s standard almost verbatim, including its motive and 
opportunity test,35 but the Joint Conference Committee36 declined to 
adopt it.37 Despite President Clinton’s endorsement of the Second 
Circuit’s pleading standard, the Joint Conference Committee stated 
that it intended “to strengthen existing pleading requirements,” and 
therefore opted to exclude “certain language relating to motive, 
opportunity, or recklessness.”38 
 
II. MAKOR ISSUES & RIGHTS, LTD. V. TELLABS, INC.:  
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT WEIGHS IN 
 
Investors, litigators, executives, and courts were all surprised to 
see the Seventh Circuit, one of the main securities litigation circuits in 
the country, avoid the PSLRA pleading requirements issue for nearly a 
decade. But in January of 2006, the Seventh Circuit issued its long-
awaited decision addressing the PSLRA’s heightened pleading 
                                                 
33 In re Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1993). 
34 S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995). Needless to say, and as this article 
demonstrates, Congress was wrong in its prediction that the PSLRA pleading 
standard would not create additional litigation. 
35 See 141 Cong. Rec. S9150-01, at S9170 (daily ed. June 27, 1995). 
36 The Joint Conference Committee was responsible for reconciling the 
differences between the House and Senate Bills. The Committee was made up of 
House and Senate managers; In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 
978 (9th Cir. 1999). 
37 See generally 141 Cong. Rec. H13691-08, at H13702 (daily ed. Nov. 28, 
1995) (Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference). 
38 Id. 
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standards.39 In Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., the 
plaintiffs accused Tellabs, a manufacturer of specialized equipment 
used in fiber optic cable networks, and Tellabs’ executive officers, of 
engaging in a scheme to deceive the investing public about the true 
value of Tellabs’ stock.40 The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged three 
statutory violations: (1) corporate securities fraud, in violation of 
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;41 (2) “control 
person” liability for the securities fraud against two Tellabs executives, 
pursuant to section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act;42 and (3) 
illegal insider trading in violation of section 20A of the Securities 
Exchange Act against one Tellabs executive.43 After the district court 
granted Tellabs’ motion to dismiss for failure to adequately plead, 
Makor appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.44 
 
A. Facts of the Case 
 
The plaintiffs in Makor, a putative class of Tellabs stockholders, 
alleged fraudulent corporate conduct by Tellabs that spanned an 
eighteen-month period.45 Beginning in December of 2000, Tellabs 
announced the release and immediate availability of its newest 
product, the TITAN 6500 system.46 In addition to this announcement, 
Tellabs’ Chief Executive Officer (CEO) predicted that the TITAN 
6500’s predecessor, the TITAN 5500, would continue growing as 
                                                 
39 See generally Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 
595 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Here At Last, http://www.the10b-
5daily.com/archives/00670.html (Jan. 27, 2006, 16:45 EST).  
40 See generally Makor, 437 F.3d 588. 
41 Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u-4(b). 
42 Section 20(a) of the Security Exchange Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78t. 
43 Section 20A of the Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1; see Makor, 437 F.3d 
at 594. 
44 Makor, 437 F.3d at 594. The case was originally filed in the Northern 
District of Illinois. See also Johnson v. Tellabs, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 941 (N.D. Ill. 
2004) (the District Court appoint Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. as Lead Plaintiff 
shortly after the filing of the Complaint).  
45 Makor, 437 F.3d at 588. 
46 Id. at 592. 
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well.47 Over the next few months, Tellabs executives continued to 
release press statements claiming that “customers are buying more and 
more Tellabs equipment” and that “demand for [the TITAN 6500] is 
exceeding [Tellabs’] expectations.”48 Around this time, Tellabs stock 
was valued at $67 per share.49 Until March of 2001, Tellabs publicly 
reported that business was thriving, and subsequently, stock prices 
were rising.50 
In March of 2001, in its first public suggestion that business was 
not quite as booming as it had portrayed, Tellabs reduced its first 
quarter sales projections from an $890 million to $865 million range to 
an $830 million to $865 million range.51 Despite this decrease, Tellabs 
executives continued to state that TITAN 5500 and 6500 sales 
thrived.52 Yet in April of 2001, Tellabs again reduced its first quarter 
sales projections to $772 million.53 When investors questioned this 
projection and asked if it was due to a lower than expected demand for 
the TITAN 6500, Tellabs’ CEO said that “the only reason for the 
downward projections was that Tellabs’s customers were pushing 
orders back from the first to the second quarter of 2001.”54 Two weeks 
later, Tellabs announced that its first quarter sales were $772 million.55 
Things continued to appear rosy for Tellabs through the second 
quarter until Tellabs again substantially reduced its quarterly sales 
projections.56 On June 19, 2001, Tellabs announced that its second 
quarter revenues were only $500 million, significantly less than the 
                                                 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 See id. at 593. 
50 See id. at 592-93. 
51 Id. at 592. Tellabs attributed this decrease to “lower-than-expected growth in 
Tellabs’ CABLESPAN® business, a product unrelated to this action.” Id.  
52 Id. at 592-93. For example, on a conference call with analysts, Tellabs’ CEO 
said that Tellabs’ core products, such as the TITAN 6100 and 6500 continue to 
grow. Similarly, Tellabs’ CEO reported that Tellabs was still seeing the TITAN 
5500 maintain its growth rate after an investor questioned the TITAN 5500’s 
strength and demand. Id.  
53 Id. at 593. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 See id. at 592-93. 
10
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projected estimate of $800 million.57 Tellabs’ CEO told investors that 
the reduction was “almost entirely because of an enormous reduction 
in TITAN 5500 sales.”58 On June 20, 2001, Tellabs’ stock price 
dropped to $15.87 per share.59 
 
B. Issues Presented on Appeal 
 
The Seventh Circuit faced multiple issues of first impression in 
Makor.60 First, the court had to determine whether the substantive 
standard of scienter had changed under the PSLRA.61 On this issue, 
the court considered the two existing standards used by the other 
circuit courts of appeals: (1) that “recklessness” was sufficient; and (2) 
that “severe recklessness” or “deliberate recklessness” was required.62 
Next, the court was asked what facts would suffice to create the 
requisite “strong inference” of scienter.63 In this determination, the 
court reviewed the three-way split amongst its sister circuits regarding 
that standard.64 The Seventh Circuit was finally ready to address the 
PSLRA head-on regarding these unsettled issues of law.65 
                                                 
57 Id. Tellabs had originally projected a range of $780 million to $820 million 
for its second quarter sales. Id.  
58 Id. at 593. 
59Id. 
60 See generally id. For the purposes of this article, discussion is restricted to 
the two main issues of scienter: (1) the substantive standard of recklessness; and (2) 
the motive and opportunity test. 
61 See id. at 600-01. 
62 Id. at 600 (citing In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 979 
(Ninth Ciruit)); see also Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1284 (11th 
Cir. 1999) (applying a “deliberate recklessness” scienter standard).  
63 Makor, 437 F.3d at 601. 
64 Id. at 601-02.  
65 The court also determined, as an issue of first impression, whether 
confidential sources must be identified. Id. at 596. Agreeing with all its sister 
circuits, the court held that confidential sources need not be explicitly identified, but 
that sufficient facts supporting the sources knowledge be pled. Id. While some of the 
circuits, including the Makor court, interpret the Ninth Circuit to hold that 
confidential sources must be explicitly named and identified, a close reading of In re 
Silicon Graphics seems to put the Ninth Circuit in the same category as the rest of 
the circuits in that In re Silicon Graphics does not require the identities to be 
11
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1. The Substantive Standard of Scienter 
 
The court first evaluated the standard of recklessness under the 
PSLRA. Acknowledging the pre-PSLRA scienter standard and 
Congress’ choice to use the same “required state of mind” language 
without redefining such, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Congress 
did not make the substantive scienter standard of recklessness more 
stringent through the PSLRA.66 Instead, the Seventh Circuit adhered to 
the same definition of recklessness that it and the other circuits had for 
years: that recklessness is “an extreme departure from the standards of 
ordinary care . . . which presents a danger of misleading buyers or 
sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the 
actor must be aware of it.”67 In short, the Seventh Circuit joined the 
First,68 Second,69 Third,70 Fourth,71 Fifth,72 Sixth,73 Eighth,74 and 
Tenth75 Circuits in holding that the substantive scienter requirement 
                                                                                                                   
disclosed, but does require specifics details regarding the sources’ information and 
facts indicative of their reliability. See In re Silicon, 183 F.3d at 985 (9th Cir. 1999). 
As another issue of first impression, the court held that scienter allegations made 
against one defendant cannot be imputed to the other defendants in the action. 
Makor, 437 F.3d at 602-03 (rejecting the “group pleading presumption”).  
66 Makor, 437 F.3d at 601. All of the other circuits except for the Ninth Circuit, 
and arguably the Eleventh Circuit, have likewise held that the recklessness standard 
did not change with the passage of the PSLRA. See id. at 600-01 (concluding that all 
circuit courts of appeals, except for the Ninth Circuit, have held that the substantive 
standard of recklessness remains unchanged after the PSLRA). 
67 Id. at 600 (citing Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 
1045 (7th Cir.) (quotation removed) (applying the standard to omissions)); see also 
SEC v. Jakubowski, 150 F.3d 675, 681-82 (7th Cir. 1998) (applying the Sundstrand 
scienter standard in a case decided after the passage of the PSLRA).  
68 Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185 (1st Cir. 1999). 
69 Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 309 (2d Cir. 2000).  
70 See also In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 536 (3d Cir. 1999). 
71 Ottman v. Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 346 (4th Cir. 2003). 
72 Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 408 (5th Cir. 2001).  
73 Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 550 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc).  
74 Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 659 (8th 
Cir. 2001). 
75 Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos., Inc., 264 F.3d 1245, 1260 (10th Cir. 2001).  
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remained the same after the PSLRA and required a showing of 
“reckless” conduct: nothing more, nothing less. 
 
2. “Strong Inference” of Scienter 
 
The court next addressed whether the Second Circuit’s motive and 
opportunity test survived the PSLRA.76 In determining the issue, the 
Seventh Circuit carefully examined the opinions written by the other 
circuits.77 Taking note of the broad range of disagreement amongst its 
fellow circuit courts, the Seventh Circuit adopted the “middle of the 
road” approach taken by the majority of the other circuits, which 
allows the courts to decide whether allegations of motive and 
opportunity to defraud are sufficient to create a strong inference of 
scienter on a case-by-case basis.78 In doing so, the Seventh Circuit 
rejected the notion of a bright-line rule for adequate scienter pleadings 
involving allegations of motive and opportunity to defraud.  
After briefly evaluating the legislative history of the PSLRA’s 
heightened pleading requirements, the court pointed out that the 
“scope [of legislation] is not limited by the cerebrations of those who 
voted for or signed it into law.”79 Absent a detailed instruction of what 
pleadings are sufficient to create a “strong inference” of scienter, the 
court should consider all of the circumstances of the case collectively 
to determine if they create the requisite inference.80 Under this 
standard, the Seventh Circuit held that motive and opportunity may be 
useful indicators, but because the PSLRA does not require or reject 
                                                 
76 Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 601-02 (7th Cir. 
2006).  
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 601; accord Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 195-97 (1st 
Cir. 1999); Ottman v. Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 345 (4th Cir. 
2003); Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 411-12 (5th Cir. 2001); Helwig, 
251 F.3d at 550-52 (Sixth Circuit); Florida State Board of Administration v. Green 
Tree Financial Corporation, 270 F.3d 645, 659-60 (8th Cir. 2001); and Fleming Cos, 
264 F.3d at 1261-63 (Tenth Circuit).  
79 Makor, 437 F.3d at 601 (quoting United States v. Mitra, 405 F.3d 492, 495 
(7th Cir. 2005)).  
80 Id.  
13
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such for sufficiency, the decision is essentially left to the discretion of 
the court, but is limited by the traditional factfinder’s role.81 In short, 
“[i]f a reasonable person could not draw a [strong inference of 
scienter] from the alleged facts, the defendants are entitled to dismissal 
[because] the complaint would fail as a matter of law to meet the 
requirements of § 78u-4(b)(2).”82 In short, the Seventh Circuit neither 
accepted nor rejected the notion that allegations of motive and 
opportunity to defraud will always be sufficient or insufficient to 
create a strong inference of scienter in securities fraud actions. Instead, 
the court held that allegations of motive and opportunity can be 
sufficient to plead a strong inference of scienter, but that it will be 
determined by the totality of circumstances contained in the 
complaint.83  
 
III. DISSENT THROUGHOUT THE CIRCUITS:  
THE SUBSTANTIVE STANDARD OF SCIENTER AND THE INTERPRETATION 
OF “STRONG INFERENCE” 
 
Contrary to Congress’ prediction that the PSLRA’s pleading 
requirements would not generate additional litigation, the circuit 
courts of appeals disagree as to what the substantive standard of 
scienter is and what Congress meant by “strong inference that the 
defendant acted with the required state of mind.”84 As a result, two 
different substantive standards of scienter and three different standards 
                                                 
81 See id. at 601-02. While the Sixth Circuit’s similar approach has been 
criticized as a violation of the plaintiff’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial on 
factual issues, the Seventh Circuit stopped just short of the Sixth Circuit approach by 
limiting the court’s discretion to the traditional standard of “a reasonable person 
could infer that the defendant acted with the required intent.” Id. at 602; see Fidel v. 
Farley, 392 F.3d 220, 227 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Helwig, 251 F.3d at 553); see 
also Monroe Employees Retirement Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 683 
n.25 (6th Cir. 2005). 
82 Makor, 437 F.3d at 602 (citing Adams v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 340 F.3d 
1083, 1105 (10th Cir. 2003)).  
83 Cf.. Makor, 437 F.3d at 601-02.  
84 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2); see also Makor, 437 F.3d at 600-02 (describing 
the differing interpretations of the circuits courts of appeals). 
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of “strong inference” are being implemented across the country, 
defeating the PSLRA’s purpose of uniformity in securities fraud 
actions pleading requirements.85 
 
A. The Second and Third Circuits’ Interpretation  
 
1. Substantive Standard of Scienter Remains “Recklessness” 
 
The Second Circuit in Novak v. Kasaks86 and the Third Circuit in In re 
Advanta Corp. Securities Litigation87 maintain the view that Congress 
codified the standard set forth by the Second Circuit prior to the 
PSLRA, which required plaintiffs to “state with particularity facts 
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the 
required state of mind.”88 The Second Circuit’s substantive standard of 
scienter prior to the enactment of the PSLRA could be met by pleading 
“recklessness,” defined as conduct which is “highly unreasonable,” 
and which represents “an extreme departure from the standards of 
ordinary care . . . to the extent that the danger was either known to the 
defendant or so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of 
it.”89 Because Congress explicitly used the Second Circuit’s language 
of “strong inference” and “required state of mind,” the Second and 
Third Circuits reasoned that Congress did not intend to change the 
substantive scienter standard.90 
                                                 
85 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4.  
86 216 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2000). While Novak is not the first case within the 
Second Circuit to determine the scienter pleading standard, it is regarded as the 
Second Circuit’s leading authority because the court’s prior decisions failed to 
adequately explain its decision to adopt the pre-PSLRA motive and opportunity test. 
E.g., Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 1999). 
87 180 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 1999). 
88 See Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 308-10 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Press, 
166 F.3d at 537-38; In re Advanta, 180 F.3d at 534.  
89 Novak, 216 F.3d at 308 (quoting Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 
570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d. Cir. 1978) (quoting Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 
790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977) (defining recklessness))). 
90 Cf. Novak, 216 F.3d at 308-310; see also Press, 166 F.3d at 537-38; In re 
Advanta, 180 F.3d at 534. 
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2. “Motive and Opportunity” Alone Always Suffices to Create a  
Strong Inference of Scienter under the PSLRA 
 
After determining that the substantive standard of recklessness 
was adequate to allege scienter, the Second and Third Circuits went on 
to adopt the Second Circuit’s pre-PSLRA approach to the “strong 
inference” issue, which allowed a plaintiff to sufficiently plead a 
securities fraud action by alleging that the defendant had a motive and 
opportunity to defraud.91 The Second and Third Circuits reasoned that 
Congress’ use of the substantially same language of “strong inference” 
as the Second Circuit’s pre-PSLRA scienter standard “‘bespeaks an 
intention to import’ judicial interpretations of that language into the 
new statute.”92 Next, these courts reasoned that because the statutory 
text is unambiguous, resort to the legislative history or the purposes of 
the PSLRA is not required.93 Even if the courts did consider the 
legislative history of the PSLRA, it contains conflicting expressions of 
intent and would not change their interpretation.94 All the legislative 
history provides is that Congress intended to make securities fraud 
pleading standards more stringent, and it did just that by incorporating 
the Second Circuit’s “strong inference” standard.95 Although Congress 
                                                 
91 See Press, 166 F.3d at 538 (to reject that the motive and opportunity test can 
sufficiently plead scienter takes this issue of fact away from the factfinder); Novak, 
216 F.3d at 309-10 (reasoning that although the court need not wed itself to terms 
like motive and opportunity, allegations that adequately prove motive and 
opportunity are sufficient to plead a securities fraud claim); In re Advanta, 180 F.3d 
at 530-35 (same). 
92 Novak, 216 F.3d at 310 (citing United States v. Johnson, 14 F.3d 766, 770 
(2d Cir. 1994)); see In re Advanta, 180 F.3d at 533-34 (Congress’ use of the Second 
Circuit’s language compels the conclusion that it adopted an equally stringent 
pleading standard). 
93 Novak, 216 F.3d at 310; In re Advanta, 180 F.3d at 533-34. 
94 Novak, 216 F.3d at 310-11; see In re Advanta, 180 F.3d at 531 (“The Reform 
Act’s legislative history on this point is ambiguous and even contradictory”).  
95 See Novak, 216 F.3d at 310; In re Advanta, 180 F.3d at 533-34. The courts 
explained that the Second Circuit’s “strong inference” standard was the most 
stringent in the nation prior to the PSLRA’s enactment, so it is reasonable that the 
PSLRA sought to strengthen the pleading requirements by adopting the Second 
16
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opted not to use words such as “motive” or “opportunity,” its reference 
to the Second Circuit’s pre-PSLRA case law for guidance on what 
constitutes a strong inference supports the position that the Second 
Circuit’s motive and opportunity test is still a valid way of establishing 
a strong inference of scienter.96 
 
B. The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits’ Interpretation 
 
1. Substantive Standard of Scienter is “Super-Recklessness” 
 
In its scienter analysis, the Ninth Circuit adopted a “super-
recklessness” standard, which requires a plaintiff to show a “strong 
inference of deliberate or conscious recklessness” to satisfy the 
PSLRA’s scienter requirement.97 This is in contrast to the pre-PSLRA’s 
form of recklessness, adopted by all of the other circuits, which only 
require more than mere negligence.98 Although the Eleventh Circuit in 
Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc.,99 categorized itself as adopting the 
majority of circuits’ “middle of the road” approach, it repeatedly stated 
                                                                                                                   
Circuit’s requirements. Novak, 216 F.3d at 307-11; In re Advanta, 180 F.3d at 533-
34. 
96 Novak, 216 F.3d at 311; In re Advanta, 180 F.3d at 534-35. These courts did 
restrict the motive and opportunity test slightly by saying that motives commonly 
held by corporate insiders such as a desire for high corporate credit ratings or high 
stock prices that would yield higher compensation and benefits for the officers are 
insufficient. Novak, 216 F.3d at 307. 
97 In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 975 (Ninth Ciruit). 
98 Compare Id. (standard is “deliberate or conscious recklessness” or a “degree 
of recklessness that strongly suggests actual intent”); with Bryant v. Avado Brands, 
Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1284 n.21  (11th Cir. 1999) (rejecting Ninth Circuit’s “super-
recklessness” standard and adhering to that of the Sixth Circuit in In re Comshare, 
183 F.3d at 550). This difference in scienter analysis accounts for the varying 
categorization of the Bryant opinion through the case law and secondary materials. 
Cf. Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 197 (1st Cir. 1999) (categorizing 
Eleventh Circuit with the majority of circuits adopting the “middle of the road” 
approach); with Ottman v. Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 345 (4th 
Cir. 2003) (noting the Eleventh Circuit’s disagreement with the middle of the road 
approach). 
99 187 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 1999). 
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that that the Eleventh Circuit’s standard was “severe recklessness.”100 
Both the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits cited the Congressional record to 
support their positions: that Congress sought to make the pleading 
requirements for securities fraud actions more stringent.101 These 
circuits also noted that the Supreme Court suggested “scienter” meant 
“intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”102 Based on these sources, 
the Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress could not have intended to 
keep the scienter standard at recklessness: instead, it intended to 
strengthen that standard by requiring allegations beyond basic 
recklessness.103 Although the Eleventh Circuit continued to use the 
term “severe recklessness” to describe the substantive standard of 
scienter, it concluded that the plain language of PSLRA “makes it 
clear that recklessness was not eliminated as a basis for liability 
under” the PSLRA.104 While the Eleventh Circuit considered itself in 
agreement with the majority of circuits that held that the substantive 
standard did not change, by consistently requiring a showing of 
“severe” recklessness, the Eleventh Circuit imposed a higher standard 
and raised the substantive standard of scienter for securities fraud 
actions.105 
                                                 
100 Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1285-87. Within these three pages of the opinion, the 
court reiterated six times that “severe recklessness” is the standard of scienter in the 
Eleventh Circuit. 
101 See In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 974-76 (providing basis for court’s 
determination that new standard is “deliberate or conscious recklessness”); see, e.g., 
Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1281-84 (explaining “severe recklessness” standard).  
102 In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 975 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-94 n.12 (1976)); Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1281-82. 
103 E.g., In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 977 (recognizing departure from 
pre-PSLRA requirement of recklessness); Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1281-84 
(acknowledging that the PSLRA did not change the substantive standard of scienter, 
but that “severe” recklessness is standard in Eleventh Circuit).  
104 Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1284 n.21 (rejecting In re Silicon Graphics’ more 
stringent standard of recklessness). 
105 Compare. Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 197 (1st Cir. 1999) 
(categorizing Eleventh Circuit with the majority of circuits adopting the “middle of 
the road” approach); with Ottman v. Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 
345 (4th Cir. 2003) (noting the Eleventh Circuit’s disagreement with the middle of 
the road approach). 
18
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2. “Motive and Opportunity” Alone Never Suffices to Establish a 
Strong Inference of Scienter under the PSLRA 
 
In considering the Second Circuits’ pre-PSLRA motive and 
opportunity test, both the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits found that the 
motive and opportunity test contradicts the goal of the PSLRA to curb 
abusive securities actions because it lowers the requisite state of mind 
from a substantive standard of “severe recklessness” to an evidentiary 
standard of inferences of recklessness or willfulness.106 Similarly, the 
Bryant court believed that the motive and opportunity test was not 
well-rooted enough to assume that the PSLRA codified it sub silentio 
based on its use of the phrase “strong inference.”107 The In re Silicon 
Graphics Inc. Securities Litigation108 court also believed that Congress 
implicitly rejected the motive and opportunity test by rejecting the 
Senate’s amendment codifying the Second Circuit approach.109 Under 
the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, facts showing a motive and 
opportunity to defraud might provide evidence to support a finding of 
the required scienter, but a mere showing of motive and opportunity is 
insufficient to plead scienter, both under the Ninth Circuit’s “deliberate 
recklessness” and the Eleventh Circuit’s “severe recklessness” 
standards.110 
                                                 
106 Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1286; see In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 977-78 
(this approach is the best conclusion considering Congress’ intent to adopt a more 
stringent pleading standard than that which existed, even in the Second Circuit, prior 
to the PSLRA’s passage). 
107 Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1286 (Eleventh Circuit). 
108 183 F.3d at 970. 
109 Id. at 978 (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 
(1974) (“holding that where the conference committee has expressly declined to 
adopt proposed statutory language, its action strongly militates against a judgment 
that Congress intended [the] result that it expressly declined to enact”) (internal 
quotations omitted)).  
110 Id. at 974, 977 (deliberate recklessness); Bryant, 198 F.3d at 1286-87 
(severe recklessness). Other authors have declared that the Ninth Circuit was 
unwilling to consider evidence of motive and opportunity to create an inference of 
“deliberate recklessness,” e.g., Simmons, supra Note 19, at 668-69 (the majority of 
circuits took a middle of the road approach which allows motive and opportunity to 
19
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B. The First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits’ 
Interpretation 
 
1. Substantive Standard of Scienter Remains “Recklessness” 
 
Except for the District of Columbia Circuit, the remaining circuits 
have concluded that the PSLRA did not alter the substantive standard 
of scienter.111 This majority found that the standard of recklessness 
required by the pre-PSLRA standards remained sufficient after the 
enactment of the PSLRA.112 Therefore, like the Second and Third 
Circuits, the First,113 Fourth,114 Fifth,115 Sixth,116 Eighth,117 and 
                                                                                                                   
provide some evidence of scienter, but the Ninth Circuit is in contrast to that), 
although this is inaccurate. The Ninth Circuit explicitly noted that “[t]he plain text of 
the PSLRA leaves it open for us to consider circumstantial evidence of recklessness 
and motive and opportunity as evidence of deliberate recklessness.” In re Silicon 
Graphics, 183 F.3d at 977. 
111 See Florida State Board of Administration v. Green Tree Financial 
Corporation, 270 F.3d 645, 653-54 n.7 (8th Cir. 2001) (noting that there is 
“substantial agreement among the Circuits that have considered the question that 15 
U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) was not intended to alter the substantive standard for scienter”) 
(citing Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 409 (5th Cir. 2001); Philadelphia 
v. Fleming Cos., Inc., 264 F.3d 1245, 1258-60 (10th Cir. 2001); Greebel v. FTP 
Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 198-201 (1st Cir. 1999); Phillips v. LCI Int’l, Inc., 190 
F.3d 609, 620 (4th Cir. 1999); Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1283-
844 (11th Cir. 1999); In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 548-49 (6th Cir. 
1999); In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 534 (3d Cir. 1999); Press v. 
Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529 537-38 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
112 Greebel, 194 F.3d at 200 (First Circuit); Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 
309 (2d Cir. 2000); In re Advanta, 180 F.3d at 534 (Third Circuit); Ottman, 353 F.3d 
at 343, n.3 (Fourth Circuit); Nathenson, 267 F.3d at 408-09 (Fifth Circuit); In re 
Comshare, 183 F.3d at 548-49 (Sixth Circuit); In re AMDOCS Ltd. Sec. Litig., 390 
F.3d 542, 550 (8th Cir. 2004); Adams v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 340 F.3d 1083, 1105 
(10th Cir. 2003); see also Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1283-84 (Eleventh Circuit) (holding 
that the substantive standard is “recklessness,” but applying a “severe recklessness” 
standard in its analysis). 
113 See Greebel, 194 F.3d at 195-96. 
114 See Ottman, 353 F.3d at 345. 
115 See Nathensen, 267 F.3d at 411-12. 
20
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Tenth118 Circuits allow a showing of recklessness to suffice for 
scienter. 
 
2. “Motive and Opportunity” Alone Sometimes Suffices to Establish a 
Strong Inference of Scienter under the PSLRA 
 
These circuits, like the Seventh Circuit, hesitated in joining the 
extremes presented by the other circuits on the issue of “motive and 
opportunity” pleading, and instead, opted for the “middle of the road,” 
flexible standard.119 This “middle of the road” approach allows for 
case-specific analyses for scienter pleadings.120 Instead of holding that 
the Second Circuit’s motive and opportunity test absolutely survived 
or ceased after the PSLRA’s passage, these “middle of the road-ers” 
held that while facts showing motive and opportunity to defraud may 
adequately allege scienter, whether those facts create a strong 
inference of scienter should be determined on a case-by-case basis 
determined by the facts alleged in the complaint.121 Under certain 
circumstances, facts providing evidence of a motive and opportunity to 
                                                                                                                   
116 See Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 550-52 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc). 
117 See Florida State Board of Administration v. Green Tree Financial 
Corporation, 270 F.3d 645, 659-60 (8th Cir. 2001). 
118 See Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos., Inc., 264 F.3d 1245, 1258 (10th Cir. 
2001). 
119 See generally Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 195-96 (1st Cir. 
1999); Ottman, 353 F.3d at 345 (Fourth Circuit); Nathensen, 267 F.3d at 411-12 
(Fifth Circuit); Helwig, 251 F.3d at 550-52 (Sixth Circuit); Makor Issues & Rights, 
Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 601-02 (7th Cir. 2006); Green Tree, 270 F.3d at 
659-60 (Eighth Circuit);Fleming Cos, 264 F.3d at 1261-63 (Tenth Circuit). 
120 See generally Greebel, 194 F.3d at 195-96 (First Circuit); Ottman v. Hanger 
Orthopedic Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 345 (4th Cir. 2003); Nathensen, 267 F.3d at 
411-12 (Fifth Circuit); Helwig, 251 F.3d at 550-52 (Sixth Circuit); Makor, 437 F.3d 
at 601-02 (Seventh Circuit); Green Tree, 270 F.3d at 659-60 (Eighth Circuit); 
Fleming Cos, 264 F.3d at 1261-63 (Tenth Circuit). 
121 See Greebel, 194 F.3d at 197 (First Circuit); Ottman, 353 F.3d at 348 
(Fourth Circuit); Nathensen, 267 F.3d at 411-12 (Fifth Circuit); In re Comshare, Inc. 
Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 551 (6th Cir. 1999); Makor, 437 F.3d at 601-02 (Seventh 
Circuit); Green Tree, 270 F.3d at 659-60 (Eighth Circuit);Fleming Cos, 264 F.3d at 
1261-63 (Tenth Circuit). 
21
Sullivan: The Science of Scienter: The Private Securities Litigation Reform
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2006
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                    Volume 1, Issue 1                    Spring 2006 
348 
defraud could rise to the level sufficient to constitute a strong 
inference of scienter, although merely pleading that motive and 
opportunity exist fails to establish a strong inference of scienter.122 In 
these decisions, the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth 
Circuits rejected the contention that facts showing motive and 
opportunity can never be enough to create a “strong inference” of 
scienter, but also did not adopt the position that facts showing motive 
and opportunity are always sufficient.123 Instead of forming a steadfast 
rule as to the motive and opportunity test, these courts weigh the facts 
indicative of motive and opportunity based on the circumstances of the 
case.124 
 
IV. MAKOR DECISION’S EFFECT ON THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW: 
NEW STANDARD AT THE TRIAL LEVEL, BUT STAGNANCY AT THE 
APPELLATE LEVEL 
 
At the national appellate level, the Seventh Circuit did not present 
any new substantive standard of scienter or any new formulaic 
approach to the “strong inference” requirement that might gain the 
issues additional attention. In Makor, the Seventh Circuit jumped on 
the “middle of the road” bandwagon with the majority of the circuits 
courts of appeals, finding that the substantive standard of scienter did 
not change after the PSLRA’s enactment.125 The Seventh Circuit also 
                                                 
122 Greebel, 194 F.3d at 197 (First Circuit); In re Comshare, 183 F.3d at 551 
(Sixth Circuit); accord Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1282-83 (Eleventh Circuit) (although 
holding that motive and opportunity without facts showing severe recklessness is 
never sufficient to plead scienter).  
123 See Greebel, 194 F.3d at 197 (First Circuit); Ottman, 353 F.3d at 348 
(Fourth Circuit); Nathensen, 267 F.3d at 411-12 (Fifth Circuit); In re Comshare, 183 
F.3d at 551 (Sixth Circuit); Makor, 437 F.3d at 601-02 (Seventh Circuit); Green 
Tree, 270 F.3d at 659-60 (Eighth Circuit); Fleming Cos, 264 F.3d at 1261-63 (Tenth 
Circuit). 
124 See, e.g., Ottman, 353 F.3d at 345-46. 
125 See Makor, 437 F.3d at 601-02; see also Greebel, 194 F.3d at 200 (First 
Circuit); Novak, 216 F.3d at 308-09 (Second Circuit); In re Advanta Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 534 (3d Cir. 1999); Ottman, 353 F.3d at 343 n.3 (Fourth 
Circuit); Nathenson, 267 F.3d at 408-09 (Fifth Circuit); In re Comshare, 183 F.3d at 
548-49 (Sixth Circuit); In re AMDOCS Ltd. Sec. Litig., 390 F.3d 542, 550 (8th Cir. 
22
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joined the majority in that it more or less admitted that it did not know 
if or when “motive and opportunity” would be sufficient to plead 
scienter under the PSLRA.126 This admission by seven of the circuit 
courts of appeals ought to be enough for the Supreme Court to take the 
initiative and clarify the issue, or alternatively, for Congress to revisit 
the PSLRA and clarify the scienter requirements. Except for the 
District of Columbia Circuit, all circuit courts of appeals have now 
addressed the two issues presented in Makor: (1) whether the PSLRA 
changed the substantive standard of scienter; and (2) whether facts 
showing a motive and opportunity to defraud can sufficiently allege a 
strong inference of scienter. These issues could hardly get any riper for 
certiorari than they are right now. 
The Makor decision had a far bigger impact within the Seventh 
Circuit’s district courts. Significantly, the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals contradicted its district courts’ prior decisions on the issue of 
pleading scienter by alleging a motive and opportunity to defraud.127 
                                                                                                                   
2004); Adams v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 340 F.3d 1083, 1105 (10th Cir. 2003); see 
also Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1283-84 (Eleventh Circuit) (holding that the substantive 
standard is “recklessness,” but applying a “severe recklessness” standard in its 
analysis). 
126 See Makor, 437 F.3d at 600-02; Greebel, 194 F.3d at 195-97 (First Circuit); 
Ottman, 353 F.3d at 348 (Fourth Circuit); Nathenson, 267 F.3d at 411-12 (Fifth 
Circuit); Helwig, 251 F.3d at 550-52 (Sixth Circuit); Green Tree, 270 F.3d at 659-60 
(Eighth Circuit);Fleming Cos, 264 F.3d at 1261-63 (Tenth Circuit). 
127 E.g., Selbst v. McDonald’s Corp., No. 04 C 2422, 04 C 3635, 04 C 3661, 
2005 WL 2319936, at *22 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2005); Ray v. Citigroup Global 
Markets, Inc., No. 03 C 3157, 2003 WL 22757761, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 2003); 
In re Sears, Roebuck and Co. Sec. Litig., No. 02 C 7527, 291 F. Supp. 2d 722, 726 
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2003); Schaps v. McCoy, No. 00 C 5180, 2002 WL 126523, at *3 
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2002); In re Sys. Software Assocs., No. 97 C 177, 2000 WL 
283099, at *13 (N.D. Ill. March 8, 2000); Zoghlin v. Renaissance Worldwide, Inc., 
No. 99 C 1965, 1999 WL 1004624, at *5 n.3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 1999) (noting that 
Northern District of Illinois Courts have adopted the Second Circuit’s pre-PSLRA 
standard allowing motive and opportunity pleadings to be sufficient); Rhem v. Eagle 
Fin. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246, 1251-53 (N.D. Ill. 1997); but see In re Shopko Sec. 
Litig., No. 01-C-1034, 2002 WL 32003318, at *6 n.2 (E.D. Wisc. Nov. 5, 2002) 
(acknowledging but not deciding that the middle of the road approach allows a case-
by-case analysis); Great Neck Capital Appreciation Inv. P’ship v. 
Pricewaterhousecoopers, L.P., 137 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1120 (E.D. Wisc. 2001) 
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Whereas most of the district courts within the Seventh Circuit had 
followed the Second Circuit’s standard that pleadings of motive and 
opportunity sufficiently alleged a strong inference of scienter,128 the 
Seventh Circuit in Makor adopted the approach less popular amongst 
its district courts: the “middle of the road” approach.129 In doing so, 
the Makor court made no reference to its district courts’ contrary 
decisions. Thus, within district courts of the Seventh Circuit, the law 
regarding pleading scienter has substantially changed by the Seventh 
Circuit’s rejection of the Second Circuit’s standard that adequate 
allegations of motive and opportunity create a strong inference of 
scienter. In this respect, Makor rewrote the pleading requirements of 
scienter for securities fraud actions brought in district courts within the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction.  
 
V. DID THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT MAKE THE RIGHT DECISION IN MAKOR? 
 
In a word, yes. The two important decisions made by the Makor 
court were that: (1) “recklessness” remained a sufficient the 
substantive standard of scienter after the enactment of the PSLRA; and 
(2) that pleadings showing a motive and opportunity to defraud may 
state a claim under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, but it may not always do 
so.130  
                                                                                                                   
(following the Sixth Circuit’s “middle of the road” approach, allowing pleadings of 
motive and opportunity to suffice in some cases, but not all); Chu v. Sabratek Corp., 
100 F. Supp. 2d 815, 823 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (Chu I) (same); Chu v. Sabratek Corp., 
100 F. Supp. 2d 827, 841 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (Chu II) (same); Danis v. USN Commc’ns, 
Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 923, 937-38 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (same). 
128 See, e.g., Selbst, No. 04 C 2422, 04 C 3635, 04 C 3661, 2005 WL 2319936 
at *22; Ray, No. 03 C 3157, 2003 WL 22757761 at *4; In re Sears, Roebuck and 
Co., No. 02 C 7527, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 726; Schaps, No. 00 C 5180, 2002 WL 
126523 at *3; In re Sys. Software Assocs., No. 97 C 177, 2000 WL 283099 at *13; 
Zoghlin, No. 99 C 1965, 1999 WL 1004624 at *5 n.3; Rhem, 954 F. Supp. at 1251-
53. 
129 See Makor, 437 F.3d 588; see, e.g., In re Shopko, No. 01-C-1034, 2002 WL 
32003318 at *6 n.2; Great Neck Capital Appreciation Inv. P’ship, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 
1120; Chu I, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 823; Chu II, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 841; Danis, 73 F. 
Supp. 2d at 937-38. 
130 See generally Makor, 437 F.3d 588.  
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A. The Substantive Standard of Scienter 
 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision to maintain the same scienter 
standard is most compatible with the PSLRA’s language and 
legislative history. First, the language of the PSLRA states that the 
plaintiff is required to allege “with particularity facts giving rise to a 
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of 
mind.”131 Congress did not alter the required state of mind. Instead, 
Congress altered the extent to which the plaintiff must prove the 
required state of mind to adequately plead a securities fraud claim.132 
While the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits added stringency to the 
substantive scienter standard by requiring “deliberate”133 or 
“severe”134 recklessness, this anti-plaintiff exercise of judicial 
authority has no legitimate basis. Furthermore, the meaning of “state 
of mind” was undisputed prior to the PSLRA’s enactment.135 All of the 
circuits to address the issue, including the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, 
had held that a “showing of recklessness was sufficient to allege 
scienter.”136 As the Seventh Circuit reasoned, “it seems more likely . . . 
that Congress did not object to the substance of the state of mind 
standard found in the law before the passage of the Act.”137 Just as 
Congress changed the extent to which scienter must be shown by 
adding the phrase “strong inference,” it could just the same have 
modified the “required state of mind” had it so intended.138 However, 
Congress did not address the state of mind required, which leaves only 
                                                 
131 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).  
132 See id.  
133 See generally In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970 (Ninth 
Ciruit). 
134 See generally Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 1999). 
135 See Makor, 437 F.3d at 600.  
136 Id. (citing Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1569-70 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Ninth Circuit); McDonald v. Alan Bush Brokerage Co., 863 
F.2d 809, 814-15 (11th Cir. 1989)).  
137 See Makor, 437 F.3d at 600 
138 Id.  
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the reasonable interpretation that it had no intention of changing the 
previously-established standard of scienter.139  
While the Ninth Circuit claims to adopt the standard of 
recklessness articulated by the Seventh Circuit in Sundstrand, the 
standard previously noted and widely accepted through the circuits, it 
alters it by adding “deliberate” to its description of recklessness.140 
The Ninth Circuit tried to explain why it used the term “deliberate,” 
reasoning that it is suggested by the Sundstrand definition of 
“recklessness” by the terms “known” and “must have been aware.”141 
However, this causes the Ninth Circuit’s standard to be redundant 
because those terms are implicitly a part of the meaning of 
“recklessness.” Assuming the Ninth Circuit would not design 
redundant standards of law, the only other interpretation is that the 
Ninth Circuit created a higher level of recklessness than the 
Sundstrand definition. Similarly, the words “deliberate” and 
“conscious” do not appear in the Sundstrand definition of reckless.142 
The only descriptive terms provided by the Sundstrand definition that 
suggest what type of conduct is required to plead scienter are “highly 
unreasonable,” “not merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence,” 
and “extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care.”143 The 
Ninth Circuit’s dependence on the terms “known” and “must have 
been aware” describe the latter part of the recklessness definition, 
which describes “the danger of misleading buyers or sellers.”144 
                                                 
139 Id.  
140 See In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 979 (Ninth Ciruit); 
Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir.). 
141 See In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 976. Sundstrand states that: 
[R]eckless conduct may be defined as a highly unreasonable 
omission, involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable 
negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of 
ordinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or 
sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that 
the actor must have been aware of it. 
Sundstrand, 553 F.2d at 1045. 
142 See In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 976. 
143 See Sundstrand, 553 F.2d at 1045; In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 976.  
144 See Sundstrand, 553 F.2d at 1044-45. 
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Accordingly, the defendant need not “know” or have “been aware” 
that his conduct was reckless: he must only have “known” or “been 
aware” that their reckless conduct could have misled buyers or 
sellers.145 Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s heightening of the type of 
recklessness required to adequate plead scienter is misguided.  
Although the Eleventh Circuit also claims to have adopted the 
Sundstrand definition of recklessness and to have joined the majority 
of the circuits holding that the substantive standard of scienter did not 
change with the enactment of the PSLRA,146 it consistently reiterated 
that the standard for scienter in the Eleventh Circuit is “severe 
recklessness.”147 Just as the Ninth Circuit has done, the Eleventh 
Circuit has changed the scienter requirement by adding this verbiage. 
The only difference is that the Eleventh Circuit tried to slip it under 
the rug by claiming “basic agreement” with the majority of circuits 
instead of acknowledging its use of a more stringent standard.148 
The legislative history also fails to suggest any Congressional 
intent to change the substantive standard for scienter. Significantly, 
neither the Ninth nor the Eleventh Circuit decisions analyzed the 
legislative history of the PSRLA in reaching their decisions to 
heighten the substantive standard of scienter.149 In fact, the meaning of 
recklessness was hotly debated in the House of Representatives.150 The 
definition finalized and passed by the House mirrored that of the 
Sundstrand definition.151 Although this definition was not explicitly 
                                                 
145 See id. 
146 See Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1283 (11th Cir. 1999). 
147 See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1283-1287 (citing McDonald v. Alan Bush 
Brokerage Co., 863 F.2d 809, 814 (11th Cir. 1989) (consistently reiterating that the 
standard is “severe recklessness”)). 
148 Cf. Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1284 (agreeing with the Sixth Circuit’s decision of 
In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 551 (6th Cir. 1999), but applying a 
“severe recklessness” standard). 
149 See In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 976-77 (Ninth 
Ciruit); Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1283-84.  
150 See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (Conf. Rep); ); In re Advanta Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 531 n.6 (3d Cir. 1999).  
151 See 141 Cong. Rec. H2863-64 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1995). This bill, known as 
House Bill 1058 defined recklessness as “highly unreasonable conduct that (A) 
involves not merely simple or even gross negligence, but an extreme departure from 
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incorporated into the final PSLRA, the circuit courts agree that this 
was the definitive scienter standard pre-PSLRA.152 The Joint 
Conference Committee explicitly said that “[it] does not adopt a new 
and untested pleading standard that would generate additional 
litigation.”153 It is safe to assume that Congress was well-aware of the 
“contemporary legal context” surrounding the holdings by every 
circuit that recklessness was sufficient to allege scienter.154 
Accordingly, by not disturbing this well-settled legal principle of 
“recklessness” as defined in Sundstrand, courts should presume that 
Congress intended to codify that legal principle when it enacted the 
PSLRA.155 Because Congress used the exact language, “required state 
of mind” from the pre-PSLRA law, it brought with it its well-settled 
legal meaning of recklessness as sufficient for scienter.156 
 
B. “Strong Inference” of Scienter 
 
                                                                                                                   
the standards of care, and (B) presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that 
was either known to the defendant or so obvious that the defendant must have been 
consciously aware of it.” See also In re Advanta, 180 F.3d at 531 n.6. 
152 Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 600 (7th Cir. 
2006) (citing Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1569-70 (9th Cir. 
1990) (en banc)); In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1244 (3d Cir. 
1989); Van Dyke v. Coburn Enter., Inc., 873 F.2d 1094, 1100 (8th Cir. 1989); 
McDonald, 863 F.2d at 814-15 (Eleventh Circuit); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 
1114, 1117-18 (10th Cir. 1982); Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 961-
62 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 
1023-25 (6th Cir. 1979); Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 692 (1st Cir. 1978) 
(assuming without deciding that recklessness was sufficient); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman 
Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38, 44-47 (2d. Cir. 1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun 
Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 10454 (7th Cir.)).  
153 S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 15; In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 
531-32 (3d Cir. 1999). 
154 See Cottage Savings Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 561-62 (1991); see 
also cases cited supra note 152 (listing pre-PSLRA cases holding that recklessness 
was sufficient to allege scienter). 
155 See Cottage Savings Ass’n, 499 U.S. at 561-62 (when Congress enacts 
legislation directly on-point with well-settled case law, it should use exact language 
from the case law only where it intends to codify it).  
156 E.g., id. 
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Next, the Seventh Circuit’s decision to adopt the “middle of the 
road” approach towards the motive and opportunity test also seems to 
be the most practical approach. Because the legislative history seems 
contradictory and ambiguous, the best route to take is an “I know it 
when I see it” approach to scienter. Although this allows for a drift in 
the jurisprudence of the various circuits, this flexibility is appropriate 
in the securities context. Rather than holding that pleading facts to 
support motive and opportunity to defraud is rigidly sufficient or 
insufficient, the Seventh Circuit’s holding allows for a holistic 
approach.157 This approach allows the court to determine whether the 
requisite strong inference of scienter has been demonstrated based on 
the totality of the circumstances.158 Congress was very aware of the 
confusion that arose within its two chambers during the legislative 
processes of the PSLRA: the Senate’s version of the PSLRA explicitly 
codified the Second Circuit’s motive and opportunity test, but the Joint 
Conference Committee expressly denied codifying the motive and 
opportunity test.159 Congress clearly knew that the inclusion of the 
motive and opportunity test in the PSLRA was debated, and yet, 
Congress opted not to choose a side. Instead, Congress used 
ambiguous language eluding to both the codification, and at the same 
time, the rejection, of the Second Circuit’s motive and opportunity 
test.160 Because Congress neither accepted nor rejected the Second 
                                                 
157 See Here at Last, supra note 39.  
158 Cf. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 601 (7th Cir. 
2006); accord Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 197 (1st Cir. 1999); 
Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 409-11 (5th Cir. 2001); Helwig v. Vencor, 
Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 551 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc); Florida State Board of 
Administration v. Green Tree Financial Corporation, 270 F.3d 645, 659 (8th Cir. 
2001); Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos., Inc., 264 F.3d 1245, 1261-63 (10th Cir. 2001). 
159 Compare 141 Cong. Rec. S9150-01, at S9170 (daily ed. June 27, 1995) 
(Senate’s version codifies Second Circuit’s pre-PSLRA approach); with 141 Cong. 
Rec. H13691-08, at H13702 (daily ed. Nov. 28, 1995) (Joint Committee does not 
intend to codify the Second Circuit’s pre-PSLRA case law, which includes the 
motive and opportunity test). 
160 See S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995)(Congress notes that although it does 
not intend to codify the Second Circuit’s pre-PSLRA standard, courts might find this 
body of law instructive). 
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Circuit’s motive and opportunity test in the PSLRA,161 it seems 
reasonable for the courts to adopt the same perspective. In other 
words, the most logical approach is to determine, based on the facts of 
the case before the court, whether the plaintiff has established a strong 
inference of scienter.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
While the Seventh Circuit provided no new substance to the 
nationwide confusion regarding the substantive standard of scienter or 
the motive and opportunity test to establish a strong inference of 
scienter, it might at least refocus attention on the pleading 
requirements’ inconsistencies. In sum, the Seventh Circuit’s method 
keeps the pre-PSLRA substantive standard of scienter of recklessness 
and allows pleadings of a motive and opportunity to defraud to suffice 
in some cases, but not others. This approach presents the most 
practical approach and ought to be adopted. Now that all circuits 
except for the District of Columbia have decided the issues, it is time 
for the Supreme Court or Congress to address the incongruence and 
clarify the issues: in essence, to reveal the proper science of scienter.  
Amongst all the confusion, “all that can be said with confidence 
on the issue[s] is that Congress agreed on the need to curb abuses.”162 
Simply put, this is not good enough. Makor could be the prime case to 
receive certiorari and curb the inconsistencies caused by Congress’ 
lack of clarity, or alternatively, to initiate Congressional action to unify 
the circuit court’s pleading requirements for securities fraud actions 
nationwide. 
                                                 
161 See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995) (Conf. Rep). 
162 Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 192 (1st Cir. 1999).  
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